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ABSTRACT
After the initial breakthrough in the research phase of R&D a new productundergoes a
process of change, improvement and adaptation to market conditions. We model the strategic
behavior of fw in this development phase of R&D. We emphasize that a key dimensionto
this competition is the innovations that lead to product differentiation and quality improvement.
In a duopoly model with a single adoption choice, we derive endogeneously the level and
diversity of product innovations. We demonstrate the existence of equilibria in which one firm
enters early with a low quality product while the other continues to develop the technology and
eventually markets a high quality good. In such an equilibrium, no monopoly rent is dissipated
and the later innovator makes more profits. Incumbent firms may well be the early innovators,
contrary to the predictions of the "incumbency inertia" hypothesis.
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Belgium1. Introduction
An important characteristic concerning the innovation of a new product is that the
initial research breakthrough is just a first step: aflr that breakthrough, the new technology
can be further developed, improved and adapted to market conditions. At what point of
this development stage does a firm adopt the new technology? For a monopoly, the trade-
offs are clear: the longer it develops the innovation, the better the quality of the eventual
product and the higher the subsequent flow profits but, of course, the more delayed the
commencement of suchreturns.1 Inan oligopoly, how long any one firm waits to adopt
the new technology will also be determined by the adoption decisions of other firms. The
question.of interest is: will competition lead to stagnered innovations as early adopters
market lower-quality products and later adopters wait to develop the technology further and
then market higher-quality products?
In this paper we model the strategic behaviour of firms in the developmentstage as
a process of vertical differentiation. Other papers that have examined the adoption of a new
technology include Reinganum (1981), Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), Quirrnbach (1986)
and Katz and Shapiro (1987). The key difference between the currentpaper and that
literature is that we model continuing innovations and improvements whereas in those
papers the adoption of a newly discovered technology is almost always analyzed under the
assumption that at the time of discovery, it is already in a form that can be marketed and
undergoes no technical or economic modification afterwards. This difference in modelling
motivates the following two questions.
If there is no room for differentiation after the first introduction, the crucial aspect
of R&D activity becomes the to be first in the discovery and introduction of a new
product. As Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) showed, in such a model, to preempt the entry
of other firms becomes the dominant feature of the development phase. Firms dissipate all
intra-marginal rents which go to the first adopter, because any such profits to the first
mover prompts a preemptive adoption by the others. Indeed endogeneous diffusion in
adoption times emerges only if firms are able to precommit to their adoption decisions. The
first objective of this paper is to examine the question: are staggered innovations likely
when finns can improve a technology by waiting or does preemption remain the dominant
feature of the adoption stage?
A second objective is to examine the "incumbency inertia" hypothesis: that a firm
2already in the market, or more generally the firm earning the highest flow profits under the
old technology, will be less likely to adopt a new technology.2 The intuition underying this
hypothesis is simply that such a firm has the most to lose by way of cannibalization of its
existing product and hence requires the incremental benefit of a new technology to be the
highest before it switches. Note that if preemption is the dominant incentive of all firms
then this issue cannot be meaningfully analyzed.
The model we consider is motivated directly by the adoption models of Reinganum
(1981) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and somewhat more indirectly by vertical
differentiation models (for example, Shaked and Sutton (1982)). In our analysis we
consider a duopoly. An idea or a new technology arrives exogenously into an industry, it
is commonly available, and it can be improved by the two firms.3 At any point of this
development stage a firm can incorporate the currently available technology into a product
and market it. The main conclusions of this model are:
Maturation and Rent Escalation There are two types of equilibria in the game. The first is
the classic race outcome- a preemption equilibrium with rent equalization and dissipation.
A second type of equilibrium appears with different return functions and other primitives.
Here the unique4 subgame perfect equilibrium induces staggered innovations: one firm, the
leader, enters first with a low quality product and earns temporary monopoly rents, while
the other continues to develop the technology and eventually markets a high quality
product. We call this a maturation equilibrium. Interestingly, in such an equilibrium
there is rent escalatiorra laterentry yields a higher lifetime profit (and there is no rent
dissipation). In a parametric example we show that one underlying determinant of the type
of equlibrium is consumer diversity: in this example, maturation equlibria exist if and only
if there is sufficient diversity in preferences.
incumbentAdoptsFirst A natural conjecture for the staggered equilibrium is that an
incumbent will innovate later. We argue that this conjecture overlooks a subtle signalling
problem that multiple equilibria generate. Given rent escalation, each firm prefers the
equilibrium in which it is the later adopter. However, precisely because of the
cannibalization effect, the incumbent would pick a later entry date ifitended up as the low
quality finn. This fact is common knowledge and gives the non incumbent the ability to
make a credible commitment to be the high quality firm, by simply passing up its own best
opportunity to be the first entrant
The adoption and differentiation model is presented in Section 2 while Section 3
3contains the discussion of preemption and maturation equilibria. The examination of
incumbent incentives is in Section 4. Section 5 contains a brief discussion of extensions
and further bibliography while Section 6 concludes.
2. The Innovation and Product DiffertntiptipnProblem
Consider a duopolistic market with finns indexed by a genericindex,i =1,2. j will
indexthe 'other" firm.Supposethepayoff relevant attributesoffinn i's product can be
represented bya single-dimensionalvariable:x(t) isthe level of technology or quality that
is available to firm i at instant t. The quality level can be improved at a (common) constant
rate, which we normalize to one. One may either imagine that this basicidea grows in a
publicly accessible environment like a government or university laboratory or that it grows
on account of the private activities of individual finns.5 A firm's innovative activity is
completely described by the decision on when to incorporate current quality and market its
product. Each firm is allowed a single adoption choice.6 Hence, in the sequel we shall
sometimes refer to the latter, i.e. the adoption decision, as an innovation. The flow profits
of a monopoly selling a product with attribute x will be denoted R(x). If firm i has
introduced a product with attribute x while jintroducesa product at Xj. then flow profits to
the duopolists from that point on depend on (Xi, Xj) and (Xj. x) respectively. These profits
could be thought of, for example, as the returns to (one-shot) Cournot or Bertrand
competition in the duopoly market.
We are aware that the model is simple but we believe that it is rich enough to
examine our central intuition that quality competition shapes the nature of product
development. In future work we would like to examine several generalizations; for
instance, the possibility that the growth rate of quality is endogeneously determined by the
finns. Of course, the models that have been studied in the standard homogeneous good
framework are similarly simple and this allows a comparison of conclusions.
2.1Assumptions
The principal simplifying assumption that we make is that duopoly returns depend
only on the relative qualities, i.e.
(Al)Firm i's duopol profits are given by a function, r(x -Xj),i =1,2,i
Thisassumption facilitates the analysis considerably: in Section 5 we discuss the
4consequences of relaxing it. From hereon we place a symmetry restriction ott the duopoly
profits, i.e. r =rj=r,say. This assumption is relaxed in Section 4. Also denote U =x-
Xj,the generic difference in qualities. The natural monotonicity assumptions are
(A2)i) Monopoly returns, R(x) are increasing in x.
ii) In a duopoly, r(U) is increasing in 0, whenever 0 ￿ 0.
Whether a quality laggard makes more or less as B increases, depends on the
market's preferences over diversity. We make no assumptions hence on r(B), for 0 < 0.
Further, consider the following quasi-concaviw and non-negativity assumptions:
(A3)1) e' [aR(x) + b] is strictly quasi-concave on R, for a,b e P.4. and attains a
maximum.
ii) ear(e) is strictly quasi-concave on P÷ and attains a maximum.
(A4)r and R are non-negative and differentiable.
To complete the specification of the model, we have to specify what happens if both
firms attempt to introduce a product at the same time. As is generally acknowledged, in
continuous-time modelling there is no completely satisfactory way to treat simultaneous
moves. We will make the following simplifying assumption:
(A5)If both i and] attempt to enter at any period t, then only one of them succeeds in
doing so. The probability of firm 1 entering isp E (0,1).
Remark:Simultaneousadoption is hence ruled out although adoption at any 'C > t 5
feasible. This assumption can be interpreted in at least two ways:
1) As a rationing rule induced by capacity or institutional constraints. For instance, if
there is a common "adoption technology", like advertising, with limited capacity, the firm
with first access to this technology is the one that successfully adopts. It can also be
interpreted as an institutional feature such as a patent office which randbmly selects one of
the two adoption attempts.
ii) As a consequence of the belief that the decision to adopt cannot be carried out
instantaneously. Suppose that if the decision to adopt is taken at time t, the adoption itself
occurs at t+s, where s is an atomless random variable. (In this case the payoffs should be
interpreted in an expected sense).7 Here p should be interpreted as the probability of the
event "firm l's actual adoption occurs before that of firm 2."8
2.2AnExample
5The strong assumption on returns is (Al). We present an example of Bertrand
competition, adapted from the vertical differentiation model of Shaked and Sutton (1982)
(as reported in Eaton-Lipsey (1989)) that satisfies (Al) (and additionally (A2) -(A4)).
Consumers have preferences on quality, with this preference index ranging over
[a,b], b > 2a > 0. Each consumer has y units of a numeraire good and uses it to buy a
single unit from either producer. The m-th consumer's utility from buying a good of
vintage x is mx + y -P1•= 1,2,mc [a,b]. Letting, without loss of generality, xl > x
(and writing 6 =x-x2from now on), prices P1 yield market shares of [a,rnl and [rn,b]
where the high quality customers buy from firm 1 and the market divides at rn =
(p1> P2). Straightforward computation yields prices (and profits) in Bertrand equilibrium
as




0, 0 ￿O (2)
Symmetry gives the returns for 0 c 0. In this case it is easy to see that bQth ri and
r are increasing in 8, i.e. the more diverse the products the greater the profits for both the
technological or quality leader as weU as the laggard. This is of course the well-understood
phenomenon of differentation lessening the severity of Bertrand price competition. Clearly
(Al) -(A4)are satisfied in this example. Incidentally, it is also straightforward to show
that the monopoly profits for a product of vintage x is
b2
(3)
It depends only on the upper bound of consumer preference on quality, since a
monopolist only services a fraction of the market optimally, and the choice is which of the
high quality seeking customers to serve.9
2.3Strateaies and Equilibrium
A pure strategy of firm i, aj, specifies at any time t a decision on "adopt" or "do not
adopt", if the firm has not adopted already. This decision is conditioned on the transpired
history ht, which is the knowledge: has jadoptedat any s c t and if yes, when. A strategy
6pair a= (a,a)associates with every history an outcome, a pair of adoption dates (t,t).'°
For instance if t ￿ t1 ￿ t, then writing 0 =t-
4(and hence 0<0), we get
W(h;a) =e4tt)((1 -e88)R(tl)+ eBOr(0)}
W(h;a) =e(t1_t)(e5Or(0))
The lifetime returns associated with other configuration of adoption times are easily
computed. The equilibrium concept is that of subgaxne perfection: a strategy pair a is an
equilibrium if W1(h;a*) ￿ forall other strategies a and all histories h1.
3. Pre-emntion and Maturation Equilibria
Either of two equilibria can result in our product innovation model. The first, the
classical Dre-emotion equilibrium (Fudenberg-Tirole 1985, Tirole 1989), arises from an
inability by firms to sufficiently differentiate theft products because of factors as market
lock-in by a first enD-ant, a slow imitation technology or insufficient diversity of consumer
preferences. Under alternative specifications of such primitives, a different, maturation.
equilibrium obtains: competition results in an even flow of innovations. A potential
technological leader optimally waits to develop a differentiated product. The other firm
enters earlier to exploit a temporary monopoly position. None of the rent associated with
this monopoly position is dissipated. However, an early entrant makes strictly less in
equilibrium than the eventual quality leader. An early entrant cannot, in equilibrium, make
strictly more (as Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) pointed out) but, given that time (or
technology or quality development) is unidirectional, there is no inconsistency in its making
strictly less: a first entrant cannot after all unilaterally decide to be the follower.
3.1TheFollower'sProblem
Considera continuation subgame after firm i adopts the technology at x. is
problem is to pick an optimal state x + eatwhich to follow. In other words, jsolves11
Max e-69r(O) (4)
0￿0
By (A3) ii), r50r(0) is single peaked on R+. Let this peak occur at 0* > 0. It
follows that firm jwouldfollow at x + 0*. Hence, in any best response, all strategies
prescribe: if the other firm has already moved, then move if and only if 0* has elapsed
7since the competitor's adoption. Let F(x) denote the lifetime returns
F(x) =e6X(e$*r(O*)e6'0 (5)
$, theoptimal returns to a follower's differentiation activities, is the direct index of
differentiation possibilities in the market. $isdetermined by underlying factors as diversity
in consumer preferences, imitation or learning possibilities and market lock in.
3.2The Leader's Problem
Following Fudenberg-Tirole (1985), we develop now the returns to a potential
first enrant, or leader. Let L(x) denote the returns to a finn i, evaluated at date 0, if it
innovates at quality x, anticipating an optimal follow by jatx +0.
L(x) =e8'{(l
-e38)R(x)+r&er(O)}ae$x(X1R(x) +x2)(6)
Any potential leader evaluates returns from two sources: X1R(x), the monopoly
phase and X2, the phase in which it is a technological laggard in a duopoly. The effect of
market differentiation possibilities on Xk, k =1,2are more ambiguous than the effect on .
By(A3) 1) L(x) is single-peaked. Further, note that =?R(x) +X2which is
an increasing function of x. Hence, L and F have at most one intersection and suppose
momentarily that there is in fact such an intersection. Denote this x' and let xM refer to




Proposition 1 a) Preemption Suppose that xt <M(figure1). There is a unique
purestrategy equilibrium to the development game. The associated outcome is:
Both firms uy to simultaneously adopt at 1. Firm I (resp.2) adopts with
probability p (resp. I-p) and the rernainingfinn adopts at1 + 9.
The strategies that support this equilibrium are the following:firms I andj try to innovate at
all dates after x' jf neither has innovated before that date. If £ has innovated already, j
innovates if 9 has elapsed since i's innovation.
b) Maturation Suppose that I￿xM(figure 2). There is a unique pure strategy
equilibrium.Theassociatedequilibriumoutcome is:
firm i unilaterally adopts at# and jfollows at# + 9.
8The strategies that support this equlibrium are the following: firm i tries to innovate at all
dates after # while jtriesto innovate at all dates after x1, if neither has innovated till that
date. If i has innovated already, jinnovatesif 9* has elapsed since i's innovation. There
are two asymmetric equilibria for 1=12.
Proof: Since the proof of a) is contained in that of b), we start with the latter. We first
show that the strategies outlined form a subganie perfect equilibrium. Given j'sstrategy, i
solves the following problem at any x in [O,xT): (if it has not adopted already)
Max e(zx) [X1R(z) + X2]
x
Clearlythesolution is xM if x ￿ xM and x if x > xM. So if jdoesnot adopt till x1,
is best response is to adopt at any date after xM, if it has not adopted yet. Moreover for all
x in [xM,xl), L(x) c F(x) and hence jhasno incentive to preempt i's adoption. It is further
clear that if the game was ever at x ￿ xT, a dominant strategy for either firm is to move
immediately (recall (A5): if both try to move, nature selects the actual entrant). So the
exhibited strategies in fact form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Now consider any pure strategy equilibrium. Clearly, forany x CxM,waiting and
adopting at any later x c xM dominates an immediate adoption. We now show that it
cannot be the case that there is Xj<Xj, xi,Xj C [xM, xT), with i adopting at x and j
adoptingat xj (in each case if the other has not adopted till that point). For somexi CXJ.
F(x) > L(x), x(xj, Xj). So if i anticipates following at Xj,waitingto follow at Xjis
more profitable than adopting at any xc (xj,x). But then, if firm us going to wait tillxj,
it is better forj to adopt immediately atany xc (xl,xj), rather than wait till Xj.Soin factj
moves at x if neither has moved till that point. In turn, there isxj <x2 cxj such that for
any x(x2, x1), is preferred strategy is to wait and consequently j's is to immediately
lead. It is clear that a finite iteration of this logic in fact works backto xj.12 But then, i
should not be moving at x. In other words, there can only beone leader in equilibrium.
Finally consider x ￿ x1. In this region adopting if neither has adopted before is a dominant
strateEy. I-fence equilibrium strategies are necessarily the given strategies.
The exhibited strategies are the only equilibrium strategies incase a) as well.
Clearly, for any x c xl, waiting and adopting at any later x' < x1 dominates an immediate
adoption. Consider any history starting at x > x1. It cannot be the case that only one of the
two players adopts at x. In fact, since the profit from a joint move is at this point strictly
9larger than F(x), it is better for the other player to attempt to adopt as well. On the other
hand it cannot be the case that the outcome adoption time is some x > x, with, say firm
being one of the adopters, (and possibly the only one). This cannot be an equilibrium since
firm i is better off being the sole adopter at some x" cx'. .13
Remark I From the arguments above it is clear that the "no simultaneous move"
assumption. (A5), can be replaced by a requirement that there are equilibria in subgarnes
starting at x' which result in payoffs no more than L(x1) =F(x1).
Remark 2 Consider the adoption of a (homogeneous) technology. If the fixed cost of
adoption is unchanged over time (we have in fact normalized it to zero), then 8* =0and
hence x' =0.Consequently the only possibility is that of preemption. In Shaked-Sutton
(1982), and other vertical differentiation models, there exist asymmetric equilibria (like our
maturation possibility) but there is no dynamic story for their emergence.
We shall say (see Tirole (1989)) that rents are (partially) dissipated if the first
adopter does jjrealizethe returns that it would get if it had proprietary rights on first
adoption ,i.e.if in an equilibrium the first adoption is x xM.
Corollary2 In a pre-emption equilibrium, rents are equalized and this is achieved
throughadissipation of rent. In amaturation equilibrium afollower makes strictly higher
profits,althougha leader realises the full monopoly rent.
3.4An Illustrative Example
We compute equilibria in the Shaked and Sutton model to illustrate how consumer
diversity determines whether the equilibrium is of the preemption or maturation type.
Recall that in this model (Example 2.1) consumer preference for quality (which scales the
utility function) is uniformly distributed on [a,b], 0 < a c b. We define an increase in
diversity as a decrease in a, keeping b fixed (since a change in b has an additional scale
effect as well). It can be shown that
L(x)= e.6X{U




It is easy to show that we have a maturation (resp. preemption) equilibrium if and
10only if.c(resp.>)whereis a positive constant independent of the primitives
of the model.'4 It is also clear from (7) that as diversity increases, a potential leader would
like to innovate earlier, i.e. xM(a) is an increasing function of a. This follows directly from
the fact that not adopting has a higher waiting cost, the postponement of greater duopoly
returns X2( a).
4. EntrantsVersusIncumbents
In this section we examine the incumbency inertia hypothesis: incumbent firms are
less likely to be innovators in new product development.'5 There are at least two reasons
why we investigate this hypothesis in some detail. Incumbency, as we define it here, is
one way to incorporate asymmetry between firms in an industry and it is a good proxy in
many cases to differences in size or experience. The question that interests us is whether or
not such asymmetries can identify uniquely the order of adoption (and of course whether
the order is that suggested by the hypothesis). Further although this hypothesis has been
widely investigated in many different contexts and models (for example, see Arrow (1962),
Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Reinganum (1983) as also the excellent summary in Tirole
(1989)), a number of these investigations were in essentially static models.
The main result of this section shows that although incumbents prefer postponing
innovations, in equilibrium they may be unable to do so precisely because they are known
to have this preference. An incumbent is a firm which is in the relevant market at period 0
and making some instantaneous profits it> o. Theseprofits disappear upon the adoption
of the new technology. The size of the current profits itisthen a measure of incumbent
inertia. Our principal finding (Proposition 3) is that there is a critical level of profits, say
above which the non-incumbent (entrant) does adopt first (and makes lower lifetime
A
profits).However, for it<it aforward inducuon argument suggests that in fact an
incumbent is the first to adopt .Theintuition for this result is the following: suppose that
the firms are unaware which of two equilibria (incumbent high-quality or entrant high-
quality) is being played. However it is common knowledge that if the entrant were to be
the low-quality firm it would only develop the product till date T (whereas the incumbent, if
it were low-quality, on account of cannibalization likes to wait till a later date). If date T
passes and there is no new product on the market, forward induction logic suggests that the
only reasonable conclusion that the incumbent can reach is that the potential entrant plans
on being the high-quality (second-adopter) firm in the industry. Hence the incumbent
11maximizes its returns by adopting earlier and making lower profits. The implication of
forward induction that we invoke is the one suggested by van Damme (1987, 1989) (see
also Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), pp. 464,Definition11.8, which we report): "A
solution concept Sisconsistentwith forward induction in the class of generic two-person
extensive formsifthere is no equilibrium in S such that some player i, by deviating at a
node along the equilibrium path, can ensure (with probability one) that a proper subgame G
is reached where (according to 5) all solutions but one give the player strictly less than the
equilibrium, and where exactly one solution gives the player strictly more."
From hereon, let firm 1 refer to the incumbent and firm 2 to the entrant. Then,
between period 0 and the first adoption x, firm 1 makes a flow profit Sit (and firm 2, the
entrant, makes nothing). So,
Fj(x) =(I-eX)it+F(x) (8)
Ll(x) =(1-e)ir+L(x)
Of course, F2 =Fand L2 =L.
(Fig. 3)
Proposition 3Supposethe 3ynunetricgamehada maturation equilibrium. Then
thereis aa unique forward induction proof equilibrium anda critical level of incwnbent
A
profit ir>0 suchthat:
i)for Jr ￿ir, the outcomeis: incumbentadoptsat4 and the entrant follows at41+ e*.
ii) for ir> , the equilibrium outcome is: entrant adopts at4' and the incumbent follows at
If the symmetric game had a pre-ernption equilibrium, then so does the asymmetric
gamewith an outcome:
probabilisticmove byfirm i atxt,jfollowsatyf+
Proof: It is immediate, from (8), that x, the intersection of F1 and L1, are identical
for both firms. Let us maintain the notation for this common intersection point and call it
x'. Further, precisely because adopting a new product means foregoing current profits it,
iffirm 1 Jjtoleaditwould lead later than firm 2 in a similar situation, i.e. 44>
Note that in terms of our earlier notation, 44= Mand we use the notation interchangeably.
It should be easy to see that any increase in itincreases44(i.e.increases incumbency
inertia) and leaves x' and xM unchanged.
Suppose now that the symmethc game had a maturation equilibrium. i.e. that x1>
12M Wehave two cases to consider:
Case 1: L(xM) ￿ F( xr): By arguments identical to those in Proposition 1 one can show
that there are only two subgame perfect equilibria. The first has the entrant moving at all x
￿ 4,ifthe other firm has not moved yet while the incumbent (firm 1) only adopts at x ￿
x1 if neither has adopted till such point. Of course, as a follower each follows after the
optimal gap of O. Beyond x' both firms will try to adopt if neither has adopted till that
point. The second equilibria has the roles reversed with firm 1 (the incumbent) leading at
and firm 2 only adopting (together with firm 1) after xt. Since L(4') ￿ F(xt'), the
entrant would rather follow at 4,thanlead at 4.Infact because of this preference, the
forward induction implication of van Damme (1987, 1989) (reported above) will now be
used to show that only the second of the two equilibria survives that refinement.
Suppose in fact that the first equilibrium is consistent with the refinement. Suppose
further thatthesubgame we are in is that starting at 4.Firm2 can now deviate from the
proposed strategy by not adopting at 4'(andadopting instead at Ie (4', xt')). This
deviation by finn 2takesus into a subgamewithtwo equilibria. In the first, firm 2 adopts
immediately and receives as payoff L(x') while in the second it waits for firm 1toadopt at
x and gets F(4'). But L(x') c L(4') cF(4')contradicting the above necessary
condition for forward induction. Note that firm 1 cannot credibly signal before 2's
adoption date precisely because the cannibalization factor means it is strictly better off not
innovating early.
Case 2: L(xM) >F()It is not difficult to see that there are two subgame perfect
equilibria in this case. The first is identical to the first equilibrium in case 1 with the entrant
leading at x"t. Define x"throughL(x*) =F( ).Thesecond equilibrium is: firm 2
adopts for all x in [xM,x*] or x ￿ xT, if neither has adopted before, whereas firm 1 adopts
for all x ￿ An argument identical to that for case 1 but applied now to the region
[xk,xr) shows that only the second equilibrium is consistent with forward induction. Of
course, the outcome in either case is: the entrant adopts at xM and the incumbent follows at
+0*.
Sinceis increasing (and hence F(xr )isdecreasing) in incumbent profit
13A
thereis a cntical profit level it which divides the two cases above and below which the
entrant can credibly signal his unwillingness to lead and force the incumbent, despite the
A
cannibalizationeffect, into a leadership position. For it ￿ it, the cannibalization effect
dominates. Finally note that if the syrnmeuic game had a preemption equilibrium, i.e. if xt
<AM, then xt c xr and hence the only equilibrium is one in which both firms try to adopt
after x'.
An alternative notion of incumbency advantage can also be defined. We will call
this indirect incumbency and we will now discuss briefly its consequences. An indirect
incumbent is a finn which may not be in the precise market under consideration but has
better information about it, perhaps by virtue of selling similar products. As an index of
indirect Incumbency advantage we shall maintain that the incumbent makes higher profits:
an incumbent makes m1R, mj ￿ 1, as a monopolist, whereas an entrant only makes R (as
before) and it makes m2r as a duopolist, m ￿ 1, whereas an entrant only makes r (as
before). Denote m =ml/m2.We show (Proposition 4) that for aiiy. m> 1, the unique
equilibrium is one in which the incumbent necessarily adopts first. The reasoning is as
follows: monopoly rents are higher for the indirect incumbent and consequently the date at
which it prefers to adopt rather than be a follower is earlier for such a firm. A backward
induction argument then establishes the result.16 We have
L1(x) =e'((l-e88)miR(x)+ m2e60*r(_O)} (9)
F(x) =m2F(x)
For expositiortal purposes, in this sub-section we assume r(-6) =0.The reader
can check that flQn of the results are predicated on this; it merely makes the presentation a
lot clearer since in this case Li(x) =miL(x)and consequently xr = We maintain
notation and call this common maximum xM. Of course, L2 =L,F2 =F.Clearly, starting
from a maturation equilibrium in the symmetric game, we have figure 4.
(Fig. 4)
Proposition 4Suppose that m 2 1. Suppose also that the symmetricgamehas a
A
maturation equilibrium. Then, there is some critical incumbencyadvantage m s.t.
i) for m ci, tile unique equilibrium has incwnbent adopting at xM, the entrant atxM
+ r. No rent is dissipated but the entrant makes strictly more in equilibrium.
ii)for m ￿ art, the unique equilibrium has the same outcome as above, but the
14incumbency advantageis sufficientlybig to overwhelm the first mover disadvantage. The
incumbentmakes more.
Finally, if the symmetricequilibriumis a pre-emption equilibrium,thenso is the
asymmetric with the outcome:
incumbent adopts ati and entrant follows aix1 +.
Proof: See Appendix 2. .17
Remark Propositions 3 and 4 illustrate the usefulness of a dynamic formulation of a
vertical differentiation problem. In standard formulations as Prescott-Visscher (1977) or
Shaked-Sutton (1982) (see also the survey of such models in Eaton-Lipsey (1989)), quality
choices are essentially made in a static model: they are chosen in stage one prior to price
competition in stage two. Consequently neither the forward nor backward iAduction
arguments made above can be applied. Even in asymmetric versions of such games
typically both of the outcomes contained in the maturation possibility remain equilibrium
outcomes. By contrast we have shown that some kinds of asymmetry, no matter how
small, can uniquely identify particular equilibrium outcomes.
5. Extensions and Other Research
The principal assumption which facilitated the analysis is (Al), that duopoly returns
depend only on relative qualities. Dropping this assumption complicates the analysis but,
in a qualitative sense, leaves the main intuition and results unchanged. Note that ifduopoly
returns depend on the quality levels of both products, then the optimal amount of product
differentiation engaged in by a follower will depend on the level of the rt innovation.
Denote this dependence 0(x). The principal complication arises from not knowing, in
general, qualitative features of this function.
Yet, in two senses, the current analysis generalizes. First, it is clear that the critical
properties driving all of our results are that the follower and leader payoffs, F and L, are,
respectively, decreasing and single-peaked. These properties are consistent with duopoly
profits that depend on the quality levels of both products, under appropriate restrictions.
Second, even if F and L do not inherit these properties, there may be several equilibria but
it is still the case that all of them are of the maturation or pre-emptiontype. The gencral
analysis for this class of games may be found in Dutta and Rustichini (1993).
The controversial element of our formulation is our simplification that firms do all
15of the development before adoption and adopt only once. We can allow limited"learning
by doing", i.e. we can let a product in the market continue to be exogeneouslyimproved.
This generalization can be straightforwardly incorporated into our formulationprovided the
rate of improvement prior to an introduction (in the laboratory) isgreater than the rate of
improvement after the introduction (in the market).
A second generalization is more difficult and that relatesto repeat innovations.
Repeat innovations are an important stylised fact of the innovativeprocess. Indeed, this
issue has been discussed in a number of recentpapers; see Grossman and 1-Ielpman
(l991a, 1991b), Aghion and Howiti (1992) and Segerstrom, Anant andDinopolos (1991).
These papers, although they provide valuable insight into the innovationprocess, share a
critical common feature with the Reinganum (1981),Fudenberg and Tirole (1985),
Quinnbach (1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1987) papers that we have tried to innovateon in
this current work. This common feature is that all inventionscome "ready-made' and do
not undergo any further improvements; in the repeat innovationspapers there are, of
course, many such inventions. Hence, whenever a discovery is made it is immediately
adopted. Our central concern in this paper has been with inventions thatcan be further
improved and our interest is in the question of how much of improvementsare actually
made.
It would clearly be interesting to put the waiting andimproving considerations into
a repeated framework, as well. One aspect of this problem has been modelled in Dutta-
Rustichini (1990a), although we are far from a good understanding of the overallprocess.
We have already discussed the preemption and rent equalization result ofFudenberg
and Tirole (1985).' Reinganum (1981) showed that, given precommitmentpossibilities,
there would be a diffusion of adoption times if the fixed costs ofadoption decline over
time. These papers, as well as related work by Quirmbach (1986) and Katz andShapiro
(1987) of course consider a homogeneous good model in which the initial technology
cannot be subsequently improved.
8. Conclusions
Inthis paper we argued that an important determinant of the decision of a firm on
when to adopt a new technology is how much and how quickly future improvement of this
16technology is likely to occur. In an oligopoly an additional, strategicdeterminant is a
firm's expectations of the timing of other firms' adoption. We studied thesedecisions as a
process of vertical differentiation anddemonstrated equilibria in which firms emerge with
products of different qualities. In such diffusion of a new technologylate adopters make
strictly higher profits. We suggested that incumbents may beunable to delay their adoption
decisions since they are known to have a preference for doing so.
As a more general point we believe that it is important to recognize that the same
initial technological breakthrough can be developed in many different directions. In this
manner firms are able to compete around patents. This suggeststhat the organization of
research as well as its intensity is likely to be determined by the extent of competition in the
post-breakthrough development phase, i.e.that the adoption dynamics of a breakthrough
will influence the conduct of the research phase of R&D. We hope to investigate in the
future issues as the attractiveness of RJVs and optimal patent policies in just such a
framework.
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19Apoendix 1
In this appendix we formally construct a sequence of discrete time games whose
equilibrium outcomes have the equilibrium outcomes of our continuous time game as a
limit. For any h > 0 consider a set of discrete time periods, t =h,2hand define a
family of games G: at each of the time periods either player can choose an action 1mm the
set (0,1) (corresponding to "do not adopt" or "attempt to adopt respectively), if only one
player chooses 1, the adoption is successful whereas if both players choose 1, then player
I adopts with an exogeneously given probability p and player 2 adopts with probability 1-
p. The growth of quality level and the flow payoffs are identical to the symmetric
continuous time model (and assumptions (A2)-(A4) are maintained). For any pair of
adoption dates, t and tj we define the lifetime payoffs as in Section 2.3, with the obvious
restriction that the quality levels have to be on the time-grid
A strategy for player i maps any history, which in our game is summarized by the
knowledge: has jadoptedand if yes when, into the action set. Of course, if I has already
adopted, then his action is identically 1 thereafter. To every pair of strategies there is an
associated outcome which specifies the first and second adoption dates (or quality levels).
The payoffs to optimally following, which we denote Fh, is defined in the obvious
way (see (4)). It is easy to see that the optimal lag in the discretised problem, say 8'(h), is
within h of the optimal lag, Ow', in the continuous time model. The payoffs to the first
adopter, conditional on an optimal action of the follower, will be denoted Lh.19 It is also
easy to see that Fh and Lh converge uniformly to F and L, as h —+ 0.
We now show the following convergence result:
Lemma The set of equilibrium outcomes of the games Gh converge to the unique.
preemption or maturation, equilibrium outcome of the continuous time game.
Proof: For simplicity, we consider only the maturation case, x1 > xM. Associated with G
are the analogs, x' (h) and xM(h)(andfor small h, xt(h) > xM(h)). Define a strategy pair
for the discrete game as follows: player 1 plays action 1 if neitherplayerhas adopted and x
￿ xM(h). Player 2 plays action 1 if neither player has adopted and x ￿ xt(h). As a
follower, each player adopts with the optimal lag of O'(h).
Since Fh and Lb converge uniformly to F and L, they inherit the properües of the
20latter two functions for small h. In particular, Lh is strictly increasing (resp. decreasing)
for x ￿ xM(h)(resp.x ￿ xM(h)) and Fh is strictly decreasing. From these properties, it is
straightforward to see that the above pair of strategies constitutes a subgame perfect
equilibrium in the game (with associated outcome xM(h), xM(h)+O*(h)). Hence, the set of
equilibrium outcomes in Gh is nonempty.
We now demonstrate the fact that the set of equilibrium outcomes converges to xM,
+ash —0.It evidently suffices to show that any sequence of equilibrium first
adoption times converges to xM. Suppose, to the contrary, that we have a sequenceof
equilibrium first adoption times converging to x' >M,it is easy to show that,
for small h, at least one player is strictly better off by adopting at the period before the first
adoption date. If x' c M, then, for small h, waiting one period and then adopting
dominates immediate adoption at the candidate first adoption date.
The proof is similar for the preemption case.•
Notice that the construction above is not, specific to the symmetric game. Indeed,
the asymmetric continuous time game can be discretised in an analogous fashion.
Moreover, the lemma on equilibrium outcome convergence holds in this asymmetric game
approximation as well.
21Appendix 2
Proofof Pronosition 4:Suppose the symmetric game has a maturation equilibrium.
Note that on account of the indirect incumbency advantage 4c 4 andindeed x\ is
decreasing in m. This of course just says that the opportunity cost of the incumbent for
staying out of the market is higher than that of the entrant and this cost is increasing in mt.
Clearly, in any equilibrium, a dominant strategy for firm us to adopt beyond 4ifneither
has adopted before, But then, there is x' <4suchthat adoption is a dominated snutegy
for 2 at any x e [xt, 4).x1 isformally defined through
xl =max{z: L(x)F(x) x ￿ (A.1)
In the figure, x' =0.More generally, there is some left neighborhood of
4,inwhich firm 2 does better by waiting to follow, than by leading. Given this, firm l's
dominant strategy is to lead on [xt, 4).Anidentical argument as in Proposition 1 now
leads through an iterated elimination of dominated strategies to: firm 1 adopts at xM (and
any time thereafter). The entrant, firm 2 follows at xM +q.Note, despite the incumbency
advantage, the entrant makes strictly more than the incumbent.As ml, 4decreases
and hence at some critical advantage ,4 = xM.Clearly, for any m ￿ ,theequilibrium
outcome is incumbent moves at xM and makes more than the entrant..
22Addendum
Inthis addendum we discuss the case where duopoly profits depend on quality
levels and comment on the precise sense in which the results of the current paper, in which
the profits depend only on the difference in qualities, generalize. The arguments draw from
the enclosed paper that two of us wrote, "A Theory of Stopping Time Games with
Applications to Product Innovations and Asset Sales" (hereafter DR). The reason for not
including this discussion in the text is our belief that too much of a background discussion
of our other paper would be required in order to do a complete job. Hence this exercise,
which is only intended for the referees' eyes.
In DR we considered a general class of stopping games which are defined as
follows: either of two players can, at any instant, "stop" a (possibly multi-dimensional)
stochastic process (X(t): t ￿ 0). If the process is stopped by player i at time t, then his
payoffs are l(XØ) whereas those of playerj are f(X(t)); these functions are only required to
be continuous. Simultaneous moves result in a payoff to player 1 (resp. 2) of pl(X(t) + (1-
p)f(X(t)), (resp. pf(X(t) + (l—p)l(X(t))), p in (0,1).
Within this class of games, first introduced by Bensoussan and Friedman (1977)
and evidently a more general framework than the adoption game studied in this paper, we
studied stoppingequilibria. Inthe adoption game, these are equilibria in the following
strategies: player jonlyadopts beyond xt, if neither player has adopted before. Player i
solves the following maximization problem at all x ￿ x': max 40t.o) l(x'), xe [x,x1j and
stops at all x at which the solution to the problem is x itself (and also stops beyond xt, in
both cases if jhasnot adopted already). When the maximum in the above problem is
realized at xt, we have a preemption equilibrium whereas if the maximum is at x cxt we
have a maturation equilibrium (and there may be several of these). We showed
(Propositions 3-4 in DR) that j subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes in a game of timing
(like the adoption game) are generated by stopping equilibria.
It is also worth noting that, in any case, all of our results in the current paper were
driven by the fact that the functions F and L are, respectively, decreasing and single-
peaked. These properties while straightforward to derive in the difference-dependent
profits case, are evidently not limüed to this case. In this sense even our exact results are
not limited to this specification of the duopoly profit function.
231 For instance, in commenLing on the possibilility that a new technology may be furtherimproved,
Rosenberg (1982, p.108) remarks: "In their earliest stages, innovations are often highlyimperfectand
known to be so. ...Ifone anticipates significant improvements,itmay be foolish to undertake the
innovationnow - themoreso thegreaser the size of the financial commitment." Rosenberg also documents
manyhistoricalinstances of gradualadoption ofa new technology. Indeed, theoptimal timeto "stop" and
adoptthe available technology is theinstant atwhich the marginalbenefit to waiting,theexpected
improvementin profits, isexactlyequal tothediscountedcost ofprofits foregone for another instant
2Forexample. Schumpeter (1934)says. "...it is not essential to the matter—though it may happen--that
the new combinations should be carried out by the same people who control the productive or commercial
processwhichis to be displaced by the new. On the contrary, new combinations are, as a rule, embodied,
as it were, in new firms which generally do not arise out of the old ones but start producing beside them."
This phenomenon was called by Arrow the "replacement effect' (see Tirole (1989) pp 392-396 for a very
instructive discussion andReinganum(1983) (or a result on incumbency inertia in patent races). In what
follows we have in mind what Tirote calls 'drastic innovation", i.e. one which replaces the old technology.
3 In contrast, in Reinganum (1981) and Fudenberg and Tirote (1985), technology remains unchaged over
time although the cost of adopting it declines monotonically.
The equilibrium is unique up to a permutation in the labelling of the finns.
The growth rate of quality is in general stochastic and firm-specific but in the current model we abstract
from these considerations -seeSection 7 for further comments.
6Repeatinnovations, although empirically of great importance, bring up a set of issues tangential to the
main questions of interest in this paper. See, however. Section 5 for a further discussion.
In this case there is an issue as to whether the decision to adopt is reversible once the other firm is
observed to have adopted the new technology. The analogy is exact if the adoption decision is reversible.
8 Note that (AS)isequivalent to an assumption that allows 'public randomization" by the (inns. The
reader can verify that our results will remain unaltered under the alternative assumption that the two firms
can adopt simultaneously and their payoffs, if they do so, are a convex combination of the payoffs to the
leaderandfollower.
In Dutta, Lach and Rustichini (1990) we also give an example of Cournot duopolisLs, with imperfectly
substitutable products, whose returns satisfy (A1)-(A4).
10It is wellknown that continuous time game strategies in which sudden moves are possible, as in the
innovationgame,mayfailto havewell-definedoutcomes associated withthem. AU ofthe anomalies stem
fromthe factthat "instantaneous" reactions aretypically admissiblein suchgamesbutthereis noinstant
after.A sufficient condition to have well-defined outcomes is the requirement that all strategies a satisfy
limsupt.>. a(h) ￿a(h1.)(writing a(hJ=I (resp. 0) for "adopt" (resp. "not adopt")). As Section 3 witl
show, thefactthat firm jcannotreact instantaneously to firm i's adoption is not a restriction in a best
response. That firm jcannotreact instantaneously to i's non-adoption (i.e. that strategies of the form "j
adoptsthe first instant after tifi has not adopted till that point" are not allowed) is a restriction but
arguably anon-criticalone.
11 Note that flow returns were normalized to 6r(6), so the infinite horizon discounted returns are r(6).
12Else, thereis an accumulation point x 'C x1, 51. F(x) =
The remaining twopossibleconfigurationsarc:L￿ F always. The equilibrium then is triviaL each
firmattempts to moveat everyinstant. Theoutcome isprobabilistic entry by i at 0 and an optimal follow
byj at C. Conversely,F￿ L throughout. Theequilibriumstrategies are:i moves atall x￿ M.j never
moves if i has not movedbefore.The outcome is therentpreservingoneof M. xM + 9. These two
trivial equilibriaareof course special versionsofpre-emption and maturationequilibriarespectively. From
hereonwesupress discussion of these trivialcases.
14In fact= 2- - Dl2
24It is worth reiterating thatwe only consider a drasticinnovation. When an innovation is not drastic, i.e.
theprofitsofaproduct employing theoldtechnology are not driven to zero upon the entry ofaproduct
embodyingthe newtechnology,incumbentsmayweil innovate first. (See Tirole (1989). pp. 346-348for
an example).
16The intuitionissimilartothat driving the Ghemawat-Nalebuff (1986) result that in a declining
indusay the largerfinnmay be the first to exit.
7 If mc 1, then the entrant is the first finn toadopt. The argumentsinthis case are exactly the reverse
of those in the proof of Proposition4.
IS Fudenberg-Tirole also showed that for some specification of returns in their model there might be a
continuum of joint adoption equilibria which do not involve a race but do result in rent equalization and (in
all except one equilibrium) rent dissipation.
19The functions 1% and Lh are extended to the real line by linear interpolation.
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